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Abstract: This paper uses a simple VAR analysis to examine 5 CEE countries (the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia) in order to understand whether their 
business cycles are synchronized with each other and/or with the major economies that they 
are supposed to be linked with, namely the US, Germany and Russia. We find that there are 
differences across the CEE countries themselves and that there is no common CEE business 
cycle. Comparing the individual CEE business cycles with those of the dominant economies, 
we find that Hungary and Poland are related to the US business cycle, reflecting the fact that 
they are more integrated with the global economy, whereas Slovakia is closer to the Russian 
cycle. Finally, splitting the sample into the late 1990s and 2000s due to the transition nature of 
these economies in the former period shows that the influence of Russia on the CEE 
economies has declined over time. However, in contrast to the expectations that CEE 
countries are likely to be affected by Germany in the second half of the sample due to EU 
negotiations followed by full membership, among the CEE countries only the business cycle 
of Slovakia is synchronized with that of Germany. On the other hand the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland are synchronized with the US business cycle, showing that globalization 
has decreased the importance of distance.  
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1.  Introduction and Literature Review 
The synchronization of business cycles among developed countries, both within a monetary 
union and between a candidate country and a monetary union, has been studied extensively. 
These studies attempt to answer questions such as whether there exists a common business 
cycle within a group of countries or whether a candidate country should be a member of a 
monetary union since business cycle synchronization is accepted as a necessary condition for 
an optimum currency area (OCA). According to Mundell (1961), prerequisites for an OCA 
are highly correlated economic shocks, a high level of trade integration and labor mobility 
among member countries, and the existence of a federal fiscal transfer system compensating 
for adverse shocks (Frankel, 2000). However, there has been no study to our knowledge that 
analyzes the synchronization of a specific country’s business cycle with those of the major 
economies of the world to show which one is more influential. This type of analysis also has 
implications for political science as economic dominance brings about political dominance. 
The early studies on the subject point out that the business cycles of major economies seem to 
be synchronized until the Second World War (Haberler, 1937). During the post-war 
reconstruction phase, however, it appeared that business contractions in Europe until the 
1970s (Zarnowitz, 1985) and in Japan until the 1980s (Helbling and Bayoumi, 2003) were 
being replaced by mere retardations in economic activity.
1 There was a revival of interest in 
business cycle synchronization in the context of advanced economies, especially for the 
Group of Seven (G-7) countries, after the oil price shocks of 1970s. With the exception of 
Japan and Canada that did not experience a classical recession in this period, the remaining 5 
countries’ recessions in 1974-75 were synchronized, not only in terms of peaks and troughs 
but also in terms of the duration of recovery. The recessions for these countries in the early 
1980s were also closely synchronized, except for those in the United Kingdom (Helbling and 
Bayoumi, 2003).  
Unlike the 1970s and 1980s, the timing of classical recessions among G-7 seemed to disperse 
in the 1990s, so did the interest on business cycle synchronization in the literature. However, 
the interest was renewed in the new millennium after the growth slowdown in the United 
States in 2000-2001 unexpectedly spilled over to the rest of the world. The questions raised in 
the studies include whether the synchronized slowdown in this period is unusual or the result 
                                                            
1 The business cycle is defined as expansions and contractions in the general economic activity, whereas the 
alternations of above-trend and below-trend growth phases, i.e., deviations from long run trends rather than 
levels of economic aggregates are termed as growth cycles.   3 
 
of the diversification of the 1990s; whether it is a consequence of globalization, i.e., rising 
international trade and financial integration of the world economy; and whether it is caused by 
a global shock or by increasing spillovers of country-specific shocks.
2 The answer for the first 
question by Helbling and Bayoumi (2003) is that when analyzed from the perspective of 
quantitative aspects of international business cycle linkages among G-7 countries since 1973, 
the synchronized business cycles are the norm rather than the exception. 
Regarding the second question, Kose, Prasad, Terrones (2003) provide at best limited support 
for the conventional wisdom that globalization leads to an increase in the degree of 
synchronization of business cycles worldwide. Examining some summary statistics on the 
correlations of output growth rates in each country with the growth rate of the composite 
measure of world output, they find that on average, industrial countries have stronger 
correlations with world output than developing economies. For industrial countries, these 
correlations on average increase sharply in the 1970s (the oil-shock period) and rise further in 
the 1990s. For developing countries, on the other hand, these correlations are in general much 
lower compared to industrial countries and, if anything, decline in the 1990s.  
For the last question, i.e., whether business cycles synchronization is caused by a global shock 
or by increasing spillovers of country-specific shocks, dynamic factor models, which allow 
the decomposition of fluctuations in each macroeconomic aggregate into a common factor 
(common across all countries) and a country-specific factor, are used. Kose, Prasad, Terrones 
(2003) examine the changes in the relative importance of the common factor by estimating 
their model over two periods: 1960-1980 and 1981-1999. If globalization has a positive 
impact on the degree of business-cycle synchronization over time, the contribution of the 
common factor to the variation of output growth is expected to rise in the second period. 
However, the importance of the common factor for output fluctuations is found to be almost 
the same across the two sub periods, suggesting that the increased international economic 
interdependence has not significantly changed the extent of business-cycle co-movement. 
Furthermore, their results indicate that the common factor explains a much larger fraction of 
output fluctuations in industrial countries than it does in the developing countries. A similar 
result is reached in a recent paper by Altug and Bildirici (2010), who find that not only are the 
characteristics of developing economies significantly different from those of the developed 
ones, but they also tend to exhibit quite disparate behavior relative to each other, using a 
                                                            
2 The recent global recession of 2008–09 is likely to increase the interest in business cycle synchronization even 
more.   4 
 
univariate Markov regime switching approach. Yet their study documents episodes when 
business cycle activity appears highly synchronized, implying the importance of large global 
shocks in inducing major recessions, such as the oil shocks of the 1970s and 1980s as well as 
the financial shock of 2008. 
The second wave of studies on business cycle synchronization has been motivated with the 
formation of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) of the European Union, because when 
countries are considering forming a monetary union, the question of whether their business 
cycles are coordinated arises (Harding and Pagan, 2006).
3 In line with this view, EMU was 
established in three phases: coordinating economic policy, achieving economic convergence 
such that their business cycles are synchronized, and finally, culminating in the adoption of 
the euro. As a first step, the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) was introduced in 
March 1979, to reduce exchange rate variability and achieve monetary stability in Europe. 
Therefore, the studies on business cycle synchronization among EU countries started as early 
as 1992. For example, by extracting information on underlying aggregate supply and demand 
disturbances using a VAR decomposition, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992) find that the 
underlying shocks are significantly more idiosyncratic across EU members in comparison to 
shocks across the regions in the US. However, a core of EU countries, made up of Germany 
and its immediate neighbors, is found to experience shocks of similar magnitude and cohesion 
to the US regions, which may indicate that a monetary union in the EU operates better among 
the core members of the EU.  In fact, the 1980s and 1990s saw a proliferation of studies 
comparing the degree of economic integration between European countries to that between 
the US or Canadian states. As Basten (2006) points out not all methodologies used were 
uncontroversial, and yet some consensus emerged in the early 1990s, which implied that a 
core of European countries comprising of Germany, France, the Benelux area and to a lesser 
extent Austria probably has business cycle coordination, whereas a larger group including the 
countries at the periphery of Europe, such as Greece, did not. Next, there were many studies 
on the endogeneity of the optimum currency areas. The most prominent proponents of this 
argument are Frankel and Rose (1998), who stated that a monetary union will lead to an 
intensification of bilateral trade by eliminating exchange rate risk and bringing about greater 
economic and financial stability, which in turn will lead to a more equal spread of demand 
                                                            
3 Full economic and monetary union has been in effect since 1 January 2002 for twelve countries (Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) with 
additional members joining since then, namely Cyprus, Malta, Slovakia, and Slovenia.    5 
 
shocks, as well as a greater correlation of policy shocks through more similar policies, 
resulting in greater synchronization of business cycles. Since, a priori considerations alone 
cannot tell us how strong the drive towards synchronization is, an empirical answer is needed 
whether monetary union leads to greater synchronization of business cycles as a consequence 
of more correlated monetary policy under the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the 
European Monetary System (EMS). One such paper, which examines the effect of European 
Monetary System on the business cycles of participating economies in the post-ERM period, 
is Artis and Zhang (1997). They address the question of whether the functioning of the ERM 
has strengthened the linkages between the participating economies, resulting in a dilution of 
the effect of the US business cycle on these economies in favor of a stronger effect from the 
business cycle of Germany. They use monthly industrial production for the US, Japan, 
Canada, the UK, Finland, Norway, Sweden as control countries and Germany, France, Italy, 
Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Portugal and Ireland as ERM members and divide the data 
sample into two parts, corresponding to the periods before and after the formation of the ERM 
on March 1979. Contemporaneous correlations show that before the ERM was formed, most 
countries’ business cycles were linked to that of the US and that, afterwards, the group of 
ERM countries moves clearly into the German business cycle orbit. Furthermore, this shift is 
specific to the ERM group and occurs neither for Canada nor for the non-ERM European 
countries.  
The latest wave of interest in business cycle synchronization has been generated with the 
prospect of the participation of the new EU members from CEE in the EMU. These studies 
date back as early as 1998, long before CEE countries became members of the EU, and 
address directly the degree of correlation between business cycles in the EU and the accession 
countries. One of the first results on CEE obtained by Boone and Maurel (1998) basically 
calculate correlation coefficients between the cyclical components of industrial production 
and unemployment rates for the accession countries and the EU, or other reference countries, 
such as Germany, Greece, France and Portugal. Their results point towards a deeper 
integration of the CEE countries with Germany than with the EU, reflecting the old ties 
Germany had and still has with Eastern countries. It must be noted that due to the availability 
of monthly data for all EMU countries, many studies look at industrial production data, rather 
than at GDP data. The use of industrial production as a proxy for GDP is justified by a 
historically strong correlation between the two, yet industrial production does not cover all of 
GDP (Basten, 2006). Synchronization is expected to occur more quickly in industry than in   6 
 
the economy as a whole, as the former accounts for the majority of international trade, and 
ultimately our concern in the context of monetary union is GDP as a whole. Furthermore, 
although business cycles are defined as co-movements of many aggregates, GDP is the most 
inclusive measure of economic activity and is therefore a useful proxy for the overall business 
cycle. Thus, among the numerous studies on the correlation between business cycles in the 
EU and in the CEE countries, we only survey the ones in which GDP is used. 
An early example by Błaszkiewicz and Wozniak (2003), using annual as well as quarterly 
GDP data, argues that the correlation of the real growth rates seems to be smaller for the then-
candidate countries than for the EU members. Using annual GDP data, they find that while 
these coefficients are all well above 0.5 for the EU members (except for Greece), the 
respective figures for the acceding countries are extremely dispersed and often take on 
negative values. Real growth rates in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Latvia, and Lithuania 
exhibit consistently negative correlations with the Euro-zone growth rates. While those for 
Estonia are close to zero, high positive correlations were detected for Poland, Hungary, 
Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus. For these countries, the correlation gets stronger as the starting 
date of the sample moves forward, indicating that the process of convergence is taking place. 
For the correlations of real growth rates using quarterly data, Hungary and Slovenia score 
higher with respect to the other CEE countries, as they do for the annual data. Poland and 
Slovakia exhibit high correlations for quarterly industrial production, but rather chaotic and 
negative correlations in the case of GDP. Coefficients for Latvia and Lithuania are very 
unstable and often negative and finally, in contrast to its annual correlations, quarterly Czech 
correlations are positive and high. 
Another study of interest is Traistaru (2004), which investigates the bilateral correlations of 
business cycles between the CE-EU-8 countries and the current euro area members over the 
period 1990-2003, using cyclical components extracted from quarterly real GDP. The results 
indicate that the asymmetries of the business cycles between the CE-EU-8 and the euro area 
members are significant. Among these countries, average correlations of business cycles with 
the euro area are the highest for Poland, Slovenia, and Hungary. For the 1993-2001 period, 
Fidrmuc (2004) confirms the previous finding that business cycles in Hungary, Slovenia, and 
to a lesser extent, Poland, are strongly correlated with the business cycle in Germany, while 
those of Czech Republic and Slovakia are not, indicating that country-specific shocks may 
still have significant effects on the latter two countries.   7 
 
Darvas and Szapáry (2005) examine the business cycle synchronization in the new EU 
members of CEE and the euro zone countries, as well as in a control group comprising of 
non-EMU EU members (Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom), two other European 
countries (Switzerland and Norway), the United States, and Japan to represent the other two 
main economic areas, and Russia. In order to reach more robust findings, they use five 
measures of synchronization, two filtering techniques and two measures of euro area 
economic activity. Their results on whether the correlation of economic activity in the CEE 
countries with the euro area has increased over time, indicate that Hungary, Poland and 
Slovenia show strong improvement in cyclical correlation from the 1993-1997 period to the 
1998-2002 period. The values of their correlation coefficients are comparable to that of 
several current EMU member states. However, their findings show that the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia are less synchronized than the aforementioned three CEE countries and the 
Baltic States are not synchronized at all 
Eickmeier and Breitung (2006) study the economic linkages between ten new members of EU 
as of 2004 and the euro area by using dynamic correlation and cohesion measures. After 
identifying the main structural common euro-area shocks, they investigate their transmission 
to new members by using a large-scale factor model. Finally, they compare the transmission 
of these shocks to new EMU members to their propagation to old members and find mixed 
results. For the quarterly series, ranging from 1993 to 2003, business cycle correlations are 
lower on average for the new members than for EMU countries, though they are larger than in 
some smaller peripheral countries, e.g., Greece and Portugal. 
Darvas and Vadas (2005), basing the weights on revisions of the output gap for all dates by 
recursively estimating the model, use various univariate techniques for calculating the cyclical 
component of GDP and study the dependency of the cyclical correlation with the euro area on 
the method selected, for quarterly GDP data in 1993-2004. Their results on the level and the 
change in business cycle correlation coefficients of the new EU Member States with the euro 
area differ substantially according to the specific filter adopted, which prevents them from 
drawing firm conclusions.  
In this paper, we attempt to establish which dominant economy of the world influences each 
CEE country’s business cycle, using business cycle literature tools. The CEE countries have 
historically been under the dominance of the former Soviet Union, so its successor, i.e. 
Russia, is one of these possible dominant economies. Taking into account that the major CEE 
countries, namely Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia, have become   8 
 
EU members, Germany is selected as a proxy for the EU.
4 Finally, the United States should 
be considered as another candidate for the dominance on the CEE countries as the world’s 
greatest economy. Thus, we consider the business cycles in Russia, Germany and the US as 
three anchors and try to find with which the CEE economies’ individual business cycles 
coincide. This resembles the technique used in Artis and Zhang (1997) to answer the question 
of whether the ERM has created a degree of business cycle conformity among the 
participating economies by positing that the business cycles in the US and in Germany form 
two poles of attraction which other countries’ cycles will gravitate towards. 
2.  Data and Empirical Methodology 
In order to answer the question of which of the three anchor economies’ business cycles the 
CEE economies’ individual business cycles gravitate towards, this paper employs a panel data 
set. Panel data, by providing a large number of observations, increases the degrees of 
freedom, reduces collinearity among explanatory variables and increases the probability of 
producing more reliable parameter estimates (Baltagi, 1995).  
The estimated empirical model is a vector autoregression (VAR), which is a non-structural 
approach to modeling the relationship among several variables and is commonly used for 
analyzing systems of interrelated time series. The VAR is an alternative to the structural 
approach to time series modeling, which is often plagued with inadequate economic theory in 
providing a dynamic relationship between involved parameters as well as with the 
complications that arise from the possibility that endogenous variables appear on either side 
of the equation.  
The VAR econometric framework makes it possible to ignore the need for structural 
modeling by treating every endogenous variable in the system as a function of the lagged 
values of the endogenous variables in the system, in this case the GDP per capita of the six 
countries. Since GDP per capita is a non-stationary series, growth rate of GDP per capita (y) 
is used in the empirical analysis. Essentially, the model expresses the quarter-on-quarter 
growth rate of the variable y of country i as a function of the past of that variable and of the 
other countries--all represented by y(i,t–L) and an error term, ei,t. The use of quarter-on-quarter 
growth rate eliminates the seasonality in the variable. For each of the pooled data set 
                                                            
4 GDP (PPP) of more than 100 billion dollars as of 2008 according to World Bank.     9 
 
comprised of an anchor country and the major CEE countries, the estimated equation is as 
follows: 
yi,t = Ai,t-Lyi,t–L + ei,t, 
where, yi,t is the quarter-on-quarter growth rate of GDP per capita of country i at time t, L is 
the number of lags, which is taken as 1, and i is the number of countries in each pool, i.e., 6.
5 
This model is particularly suited to responding to the question raised in this paper, since it 
allows for the specification of the dynamics for the GDP series, interdependencies among 
countries and changes over time in these interdependencies.  
However, correlations including more advanced techniques of detecting co-movements in the 
real sphere such as VARs, should be examined with the highest caution in the case of 
transition economies. As stated in Błaszkiewicz and Wozniak (2003), there is a risk of 
interpreting real GDP movements in post-socialist economies as business cycles. The 
transition to a market economy in the first half of the 1990s brought a lot of structural changes 
to these countries, but the data becomes more reliable by the end of the 1990s. Hence, in this 
study, we use the data from 1996 onwards. Our data are quarterly GDP at constant prices 
measured in units of the national currency. Letting Yi,t denote real GDP per capita of country i 
in quarter t, we take the annual quarter-to-quarter growth rate of GDP for country i as  
yi,t = ln(Yi,t) −ln (Yi,t-4) 
Table 1 provides the data sources and the sample period associated with them for the 
countries used in our study. 
3.  Results 
3.1 Summary Statistics 
We begin our analysis by looking at the characteristics of the data. Table 2 presents the 
summary statistics for our main variable, GDP per capita growth. Looking at the whole 
sample, we observe that the growth of GDP per capita is on average higher for Poland, 
Romania and Slovakia compared to the Czech Republic and Hungary. It is also apparent that 
among our three dominant economies, only Russia’s GDP per capita growth is similar to 
those of the CEE countries, which is not surprising considering that these economies together 
                                                            
5 We consider Akaike's information criterion (AIC), Schwarz's Bayesian information criterion (SBIC), and the 
Hannan and Quinn information criterion (HQIC) lag-order selection statistics to choose this lag structure.   10 
 
with Russia went through a transition process in this period. Given this fact, we also split the 
sample into two and compare the mean and standard deviations of the growth rates for two 
periods: 1994-2001 and 2002-2009. Except for Hungary, on average the growth rate of per 
capita GDP is higher in the post-2001 period for the CEE countries. This is reasonable given 
that the 1990s were a period of structural change and crisis for them. 
Next, we look at the correlation coefficients between the growth rates of GDP per capita for 
the CEE and the candidate-dominant economies in our sample. Table 3 shows that the CEE 
countries display significant differences among themselves. Poland is the most different 
country, exhibiting low positive correlations with Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia and 
a negative correlation with Romania.  
In order to answer our main question of whether the CEE countries are more in the sphere of 
the US, Germany or Russia, we can look at the last three rows of Table 3. The Czech 
Republic is the country which has the highest correlation with Russia among the three 
dominant countries. Hungary and Poland are equally correlated with Germany and the US, 
whereas Romania and Slovakia are mostly correlated with Germany. Finally, we observe that 
Hungary is the country with the highest correlation with its dominant economy, suggesting 
that its cycle is synchronized with that of the US and Germany.  
An alternative way to visually see which dominant economy each of the CEE countries are 
most influenced by is to graph the GDP growth rates over time. Figure 1 shows that among 
the dominant economies, the growth rates of GDP per capita move together for the US and 
Germany, whereas that of Russia is more volatile and fluctuates over a longer range. After a 
big collapse in output in the late 1990s, growth resumed in Russia at a higher rate than the US 
and Germany as well as most of the CEE countries. The visual analysis supports the finding 
that Hungary’s cycle is highly correlated with those of the US and Germany and not with 
Russia, as it is the only CEE country which is affected neither by the big output collapse in 
1998 nor the resumed growth in Russia afterwards.    
3.2 Regression Results 
Summary statistics by themselves are not enough to understand the linkages between the   
business cycles of the CEE countries and the 3 dominant economies that we consider to be 
influential on these economies. Thus, we turn to a simple VAR framework as discussed in 
Section 2. Previous studies on the business cycle synchronization of the CEE economies did 
not generally use this type of framework since the range of the data was not long enough, but   11 
 
having quarterly data from 1995 to 2009 gives us enough observations to be able to use a 
VAR in order to answer our main question.   
First, we run regressions for the five CEE countries to understand whether their business 
cycles are synchronized within themselves, followed by 3 set of regressions in which 
Germany, the US and Russia are added to the set comprising of the five CEE countries one by 
one. In Table 4, each column represents a VAR with the dependent variable as the GDP per 
capita growth rate of one of the CEE countries and the regressors as the first lags of the GDP 
per capita growth rate of the 5 CEE countries in the sample.  
As expected, each country’s growth rate is highly correlated with the first lag of its own 
growth rate. There is a positive effect from Hungary to Romania and from the Czech Republic 
to Slovakia, indicating that the economies of the region that have performed better 
immediately after the fall of the Eastern Bloc have some effect on the neighboring latecomer 
economies. Surprisingly, Romania has a negative effect on the GDP growth rates of Hungary 
and Poland. Apart from that, there is not much interaction across the countries, suggesting 
that CEE countries do not share a business cycle of their own. Thus, we go on to explore what 
effect the larger economies of the world have on the CEE countries.  
As a starting point, Germany is added to the CEE countries in the sample. Germany is the 
largest economy in Europe and has played the anchor role in the ERM, making it the obvious 
standard for comparison as mentioned in many studies including Bayoumi and Eichengreen 
(1992). In Table 5, the results from Table 4 do not change significantly, with the most 
dominant effect across CEE economies being that from the Czech Republic to Slovakia. 
Surprisingly, there is no effect from Germany to any of the CEE countries, whereas German 
GDP per capita growth is affected by that of Hungary and Poland. This can also be seen from 
the impulse response functions in Figure 2. One reason for this might be the large exposure of 
German banks in these two countries compared to the other three economies. Figure 3 shows 
that the investments of German banks in Hungary and Poland have also increased over time, 
especially in the last few years. This suggests that due to its close proximity and close 
economic ties, the German economy is exposed to shocks in some of the CEE countries, 
although it is the larger economy. In fact, the German economy has historically been closely 
linked to those of its eastern neighbors and despite Germany being the larger economy, this 
has been a two way relationship. For example, during the Great Depression, there was 
contagion from Austria to Germany as a result of similarities in their banking system as well 
as German investments in Austria.   12 
 
Next, a VAR is run with the CEE countries and the US. The US is an obvious candidate as the 
world’s largest economy and the last global crisis proved that developments in the US 
economy have worldwide repercussions.  Table 6 shows that the interactions across the CEE 
countries themselves continue to hold. Furthermore, the US business cycle has an effect on 
that of Hungary and Poland, which is in line with the results on correlation coefficients shown 
in Table 3. This might be due to the fact that these two economies are linked more to the 
global economy as larger recipients of capital flows. It should also be noted that none of the 
CEE countries affect the US business cycle, in contrast to the results for Germany.  Since the 
US is the largest economy of the world, there is a one way linkage where the US is the source 
of shocks affecting the rest of the world, including the CEE economies (Figure 4). On the 
other hand, the US economy does not share the close links that Germany has with the CEE 
countries as its investments are more dispersed.  
Finally, a VAR is run with Russia as the last candidate country to affect the business cycles of 
the CEE countries. The results in Table 7 indicate that Slovakia is the only country to be 
affected by the growth of GDP per capita of Russia, though inversely. Russia, on the other 
hand, is affected positively by the business cycle of Hungary. Looking at the impulse 
response functions in Figure 5, we observe that a shock to the Russian GDP per capita growth 
has a small effect on that of the CEE countries, but it disappears after a few quarters, thus not 
very influential. 
The four sets of VARs that are run to address the question of which dominant economy 
affects the business cycles of the CEE countries show that Hungary and Poland are influenced 
by the US cycle, whereas Slovakia is negatively affected by Russia. Surprisingly, no country 
is affected directly by the German business cycle. It should be noted that since the CEE 
countries are transition economies during the sample period, they have gone through a lot of 
structural changes, including changes in their trade and capital flow patterns. So, next we 
consider splitting the sample to see if there was a change in the transmission of business 
cycles across the CEE economies and the set of 3 dominant economies over time. 
The upper parts of Table 8-10 present the first period from 1996 to 2001 and the lower part 
represents the sample from 2002 to 2010 for Russia, the US and Germany respectively. 
According to Table 8, in the beginning of the sample, Russia influences the Czech Republic 
positively and Romania and Slovakia negatively. These countercyclical effects are reversed 
when further lags are included, suggesting that there is a delay in the transmission of shocks   13 
 
across countries.
6 In the latter period, on the other hand, Russian business cycle is 
synchronized with none of the CEE economies. This is an indication that the CEE countries 
have become more connected with the rest of the world as a result of the transition period. 
Another difference across the two samples is that there is more of a business cycle 
synchronization among the CEE countries in the latter period, although it is far from perfect. 
This might be due to the fact that they have been going through similar changes and used 
policies aimed at entering the EU and the EMU. 
Table 9 shows that the US is the most influential economy on the business cycle of the CEE 
countries in the latter period. In the first half of the sample, only Poland is positively affected 
by the US, whereas Slovakia is negatively correlated. This result is not surprising since 
Poland was the first country to open up to the rest of the world and start integrating with the 
global economy. In the latter period, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are in 
synchronization with movements in the GDP per capita of the US. This is consistent with 
results from other studies that show that the US economy is the source of shocks to other 
countries but is not affected from local crises in the rest of the world. The latest crisis of 
2008-2009 proved this once more, as the financial turmoil in the US led to a worldwide 
economic crisis.  
Though no effect from Germany to any of the CEE countries has been found for the whole 
period, Table 10 shows that German business cycle is effective on Slovakia in the latter 
period. Contrary to expectations, Germany is more influenced by the CEE economies than 
vice versa, possibly due to the concentration of investments in these countries, as mentioned 
before. Poland affects German GDP growth positively in the beginning of the sample, while 
Hungary besides Poland starts to be effective on Germany in the second half of the sample as 
German investments in Hungary, especially in the financial sector, increase (Figure 3).  
4.  Conclusion 
We use a simple VAR analysis to examine 5 largest  CEE economies (the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia) in order to understand whether their business cycles 
are synchronized with each other and/or with one of the major economies that they are linked 
with, namely the US, Germany and Russia. This is important given that these CEE countries 
have become members of the EU after the fall of the Eastern Bloc and are candidates for 
                                                            
6 These results are not reported here and are available upon request.   14 
 
EMU membership. Since adopting the euro implies giving up monetary policy, it is essential 
to see what drives the business cycles of the CEE countries. Through our analysis, we reach a 
few stylized facts, though we should add the caveat that the sample size is still small for these 
economies and that our results will be further enhanced as time goes on. 
First, we find that there are differences across the CEE countries themselves and that there is 
no common CEE business cycle. This finding supports our idea that the business cycle of 
each CEEC is synchronized with a different dominant economy. There are some effects from 
the larger economies of the region, Hungary and the Czech Republic, to the smaller ones, 
Romania and Slovakia, respectively, but it is not enough to talk about a common cycle. 
Looking at the dominant economies, we see that the German and the US cycles are more 
closely correlated with each other than that of Russia. This is due to the fact that the Russian 
economy went through a lot of changes in the 1990s and experienced a drastic crisis in 1998. 
Second, comparing the individual CEE business cycles with those of the dominant economies, 
we find that Hungary and Poland are related to the US business cycle, reflecting the fact that 
they are more integrated with the global economy, whereas the other two candidate dominant 
economies have no effect on the CEE countries for the whole period. Slovakia is negatively 
synchronized with Russia due to the fact that it experienced a currency crisis a few quarters 
later than the Russian crisis of 1998 as a result of inadequate reforms and macroeconomic 
imbalances at the beginning of the 1990s. These results are in line with  Darvas and Szapáry 
(2005), who find that CEE countries can be split into three groups according to their 
synchronization with the EU countries: most correlated (Hungary, Poland and Slovenia), not 
correlated (Baltic states) and somewhat correlated (the Czech Republic and Slovakia). They 
suggest that with the resuming of growth due to reforms in the countries in the last group, 
they will become more synchronized with the European cycle as well. This is supported by 
our finding that Slovakia started to be affected by the German cycle in the latter period. 
Finally, splitting the sample into the late 1990s and 2000s due to the transition nature of these 
economies shows that the influence of Russia on the CEE economies have declined over time 
as their trade with Russia collapsed and they restructured their trade towards the EU. 
However, in the second half of the sample, among the CEE countries only Slovakia is 
synchronized with the business cycle of Germany, whereas the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland are synchronized with the US business cycle. This suggests that despite their EU 
membership and close trade links with the rest of Europe, the CEE countries do not share a 
business cycle with the German business cycle, which we use as a proxy for that of the EU.   15 
 
The business cycles of the CEE countries are more synchronized with that of the US, 
especially after 2002, showing that the globalization has decreased the importance of distance. 
Furthermore, we find that Germany is more influenced by the CEE economies than vice 
versa. This finding supports the view that countries are mutually interdependent in modern 
times unlike the old vision of economic hegemony of a handful of leading economies on the 
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Table 1: Sample of Countries 
 
Country  Source  Sample Period
Czech Republic  OECD  1994:1‐2009:4 
Hungary  OECD  1995:1‐2009:4 
Poland  OECD  1995:1‐2009:4 
Romania  OECD  1994:1‐2009:4 
Slovakia  OECD  1993:1‐2009:4 
Germany  OECD  1994:1‐2009:4 
Russia  OECD  1994:1‐2009:4 
USA  FRED  1994:1‐2009:4 
 
Table 2: GDP per capita growth 
   Whole Sample  Pre 2002 Sample  Post 2002 Sample 
   Mean  Std. Dev. Mean  Std. Dev. Mean  Std. Dev. 
CZR  0.030  0.032  0.026  0.027  0.033  0.036 
HUN  0.029  0.035  0.042  0.016  0.019  0.043 
POL  0.045  0.023  0.046  0.026  0.046  0.019 
ROM  0.043  0.073  0.038  0.094  0.047  0.050 
SLK  0.044  0.041  0.038  0.037  0.050  0.045 
RUS  0.041  0.058  0.024  0.061  0.054  0.053 
USA  0.015  0.018  0.022  0.013  0.009  0.019 
DEU  0.010  0.022  0.017  0.012  0.003  0.027 
          Source: See text. 
  
Table 3: Correlation coefficients between growth rates of GDP per capita, 1994-2009 
   CZR  HUN  POL  ROM  SLK  RUS  USA  DEU 
CZR  1.000 
HUN  0.468  1.000 
POL  0.156  0.047  1.000 
ROM  0.401  0.325 ‐ 0.099  1.000 
SLK  0.658  0.309  0.117  0.415  1.000 
RUS  0.615  0.577  0.099  0.037  0.271  1.000 
USA  0.398  0.764  0.344  0.195  0.316  0.312  1.000 





Table 4: VAR Regression for CEE countries 
   CZR  HUN  POL  ROM  SLK 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
CZR  0.845*** ‐ 0.0551  0.0665 ‐ 0.00928  0.383** 
(0.0972)  (0.0822)  (0.115)  (0.358)  (0.154) 
HUN  0.1000  1.020***  0.0105  0.445*  0.0273 
(0.0713)  (0.0603)  (0.0844)  (0.262)  (0.113) 
POL  0.0717 ‐ 0.0214  0.483***  0.272  0.173 
(0.0929)  (0.0785)  (0.110)  (0.342)  (0.147) 
ROM  0.0153 ‐ 0.0569** ‐ 0.0734*  0.579***  0.0770 
(0.0323)  (0.0273)  (0.0383)  (0.119)  (0.0512) 
SLK  ‐0.0241  0.0484  0.0682  0.0257  0.518*** 
(0.0687)  (0.0581)  (0.0813)  (0.253)  (0.109) 
Constant  ‐0.00279  0.00112  0.0206*** ‐ 0.0109 ‐ 0.00345 
(0.00510)  (0.00431)  (0.00604)  (0.0188)  (0.00808) 
Observations  55  55  55  55  55 
Source: Dependent variable is the growth rate of GDP per capita. The columns represent the 
regression for each of the countries in the sample. Standard errors in parentheses,* significant at 10%; 
**significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Table 5: VAR Regression for CEE countries and Germany 
   CZR  HUN  POL  ROM  SLK  GER 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
CZR  0.839*** ‐ 0.0481  0.0599 ‐ 0.000398  0.364**  0.0348 
(0.0991)  (0.0837)  (0.117)  (0.365)  (0.157)  (0.0854) 
HUN  0.0755  1.050*** ‐ 0.0177  0.483 ‐ 0.0516  0.238** 
(0.110)  (0.0932)  (0.131)  (0.406)  (0.174)  (0.0951) 
POL  0.0576 ‐ 0.00404  0.467***  0.294  0.128  0.257*** 
(0.105)  (0.0884)  (0.124)  (0.385)  (0.165)  (0.0903) 
ROM  0.0164 ‐ 0.0582** ‐ 0.0722*  0.578***  0.0805 ‐ 0.0101 
(0.0325)  (0.0275)  (0.0385)  (0.120)  (0.0514)  (0.0280) 
SLK  ‐0.0271  0.0521  0.0648  0.0304  0.508*** ‐ 0.0335 
(0.0695)  (0.0587)  (0.0822)  (0.256)  (0.110)  (0.0599) 
GER  0.0519 ‐ 0.0637  0.0597 ‐ 0.0809  0.167  0.432*** 
(0.178)  (0.151)  (0.211)  (0.656)  (0.282)  (0.154) 
Constant  ‐0.00165 ‐ 0.000284  0.0219*** ‐ 0.0127  0.000230 ‐ 0.0129** 
(0.00643)  (0.00544)  (0.00762)  (0.0237)  (0.0102)  (0.00555) 
Observations  55  55  55  55  55  55 
Source: Dependent variable is the growth rate of GDP per capita. The columns represent the 
regression for each of the countries in the sample. Standard errors in parentheses,* significant at 10%; 




Table 6: VAR Regression for CEE countries and USA 
   CZR  HUN  POL  ROM  SLK  USA 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
CZR  0.845*** ‐ 0.0439  0.0845 ‐ 0.0391  0.374** ‐ 0.0460 
(0.0974)  (0.0788)  (0.108)  (0.352)  (0.153)  (0.0548) 
HUN  0.102  0.867*** ‐ 0.237*  0.856**  0.149 ‐ 0.00238 
(0.110)  (0.0889)  (0.122)  (0.398)  (0.173)  (0.0618) 
POL  0.0726 ‐ 0.109  0.341***  0.508  0.243  0.0557 
(0.105)  (0.0846)  (0.117)  (0.379)  (0.164)  (0.0588) 
ROM  0.0153 ‐ 0.0532** ‐ 0.0674*  0.569***  0.0740  0.0169 
(0.0324)  (0.0262)  (0.0361)  (0.117)  (0.0509)  (0.0182) 
SLK  ‐0.0239  0.0325  0.0424  0.0686  0.531*** ‐ 0.0126 
(0.0693)  (0.0560)  (0.0772)  (0.251)  (0.109)  (0.0390) 
USA  ‐0.00363  0.365**  0.592*** ‐ 0.982 ‐ 0.291  0.895*** 
(0.200)  (0.162)  (0.223)  (0.724)  (0.314)  (0.112) 
Constant  ‐0.00283  0.00447  0.0260*** ‐ 0.0199 ‐ 0.00612  3.71e‐05 
(0.00542)  (0.00438)  (0.00604)  (0.0196)  (0.00852)  (0.00305) 
Observations  55  55  55  55  55  55 
Source: Dependent variable is the growth rate of GDP per capita. The columns represent the 
regression for each of the countries in the sample. Standard errors in parentheses,* significant at 10%; 
**significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Table 7: VAR Regression for CEE countries and Russia 
   CZR  HUN  POL  ROM  SLK  RUS 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
CZR  0.803***  0.0582  0.0706  0.146  0.595***  0.156 
(0.112)  (0.0921)  (0.141)  (0.441)  (0.181)  (0.209) 
HUN  0.128  1.143***  0.0357  0.585*  0.218  0.273* 
(0.0829)  (0.0682)  (0.105)  (0.326)  (0.134)  (0.155) 
POL  0.112  0.00918  0.499***  0.293  0.202 ‐ 0.220 
(0.0883)  (0.0726)  (0.112)  (0.347)  (0.143)  (0.165) 
ROM  0.0295 ‐ 0.0724*** ‐ 0.0716*  0.555***  0.0432 ‐ 0.00954 
(0.0327)  (0.0269)  (0.0413)  (0.129)  (0.0528)  (0.0611) 
SLK  0.000555  0.0450  0.0747  0.0116  0.499***  0.0490 
(0.0656)  (0.0540)  (0.0829)  (0.258)  (0.106)  (0.123) 
RUS  0.0577 ‐ 0.0705  0.00632 ‐ 0.110 ‐ 0.150*  0.777*** 
(0.0523)  (0.0430)  (0.0661)  (0.206)  (0.0846)  (0.0978) 
Constant  ‐0.00913* ‐ 0.00448  0.0180*** ‐ 0.0152 ‐ 0.00929  0.00291 
(0.00532)  (0.00437)  (0.00672)  (0.0209)  (0.00859)  (0.00994) 
Observations  55  55  55  55  55  55 
Source: Dependent variable is the growth rate of GDP per capita. The columns represent the 
regression for each of the countries in the sample. Standard errors in parentheses,* significant at 10%; 




Table 8: VAR Regression for CEE countries and Russia: Split Sample 
   CZR  HUN  POL  ROM  SLK  RUS 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
CZR  0.352** ‐ 0.158* ‐ 0.0381  0.447  0.750*** ‐ 0.0556 
(0.151)  (0.0827)  (0.245)  (0.899)  (0.285)  (0.342) 
HUN  ‐1.171***  0.454*** ‐ 0.0217  0.574  0.713 ‐ 0.444 
(0.307)  (0.168)  (0.498)  (1.825)  (0.578)  (0.694) 
POL  0.0236 ‐ 0.0581  0.338 ‐ 0.978  0.219 ‐ 0.860** 
(0.150)  (0.0821)  (0.244)  (0.893)  (0.283)  (0.340) 
ROM  0.0873** ‐ 0.0294 ‐ 0.101  0.232 ‐ 0.00383 ‐ 0.0373 
(0.0404)  (0.0221)  (0.0656)  (0.240)  (0.0762)  (0.0914) 
SLK  ‐0.207 ‐ 0.0472 ‐ 0.0926 ‐ 1.456*  0.376 ‐ 0.377 
(0.138)  (0.0752)  (0.223)  (0.817)  (0.259)  (0.311) 
RUS  0.190**  0.0286 ‐ 0.0918 ‐ 1.107** ‐ 0.334*  0.687*** 
(0.0925)  (0.0505)  (0.150)  (0.549)  (0.174)  (0.209) 
Const.  0.0601*** 0.0320***  0.0383  0.110 ‐ 0.0285  0.0843* 
(0.0210)  (0.0115)  (0.0341)  (0.125)  (0.0396)  (0.0476) 
Obs.  23  23  23  23  23  23 
CZR  0.828***  0.000800  0.485** ‐ 0.190  0.684**  0.186 
(0.168)  (0.199)  (0.223)  (0.264)  (0.328)  (0.285) 
HUN  0.357**  1.426*** ‐ 0.312  0.977***  0.281  1.227*** 
(0.166)  (0.196)  (0.221)  (0.261)  (0.323)  (0.281) 
POL  0.160  0.143  0.309*  0.625***  0.119  0.522** 
(0.126)  (0.150)  (0.168)  (0.199)  (0.247)  (0.215) 
ROM  ‐0.249* ‐ 0.293* ‐ 0.232  0.207 ‐ 0.259 ‐ 0.280 
(0.129)  (0.153)  (0.172)  (0.203)  (0.252)  (0.219) 
SLK  ‐0.0533  0.148 ‐ 0.105  0.251  0.542**  0.463** 
(0.129)  (0.153)  (0.172)  (0.203)  (0.252)  (0.219) 
RUS  0.165 ‐ 0.143  0.310 ‐ 0.0784 ‐ 0.0292 ‐ 0.0906 
(0.218)  (0.258)  (0.290)  (0.343)  (0.425)  (0.370) 
Const.  ‐0.00572 ‐ 0.00550  0.0218*** ‐ 0.0164** ‐ 0.000397 ‐ 0.0139 
(0.00502)  (0.00594)  (0.00668)  (0.00790)  (0.00979)  (0.00852) 
Obs.  32  32  32  32  32  32 
Source: Dependent variable is the growth rate of GDP per capita. The upper part of the table 
represents the sample from 1996 to 2001 and the lower part is from 2002 to 2010. The columns 
represent the regression for each of the countries in the sample. Standard errors in parentheses, 






Table 9: VAR Regression for CEE countries and USA: Split Sample 
   CZR  HUN  POL  ROM  SLK  USA 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
CZR  0.501*** ‐ 0.125* ‐ 0.0818 ‐ 0.568  0.423* ‐ 0.0817 
(0.137)  (0.0677)  (0.194)  (0.814)  (0.240)  (0.0503) 
HUN  ‐0.901***  0.444*** ‐ 0.282 ‐ 0.310  0.539 ‐ 0.297*** 
(0.311)  (0.153)  (0.439)  (1.844)  (0.544)  (0.114) 
POL  ‐0.0489 ‐ 0.124  0.231  0.202  0.677**  0.114** 
(0.153)  (0.0756)  (0.217)  (0.910)  (0.268)  (0.0562) 
ROM  0.0267 ‐ 0.0376** ‐ 0.0695*  0.574***  0.0977*  0.0322*** 
(0.0298)  (0.0147)  (0.0421)  (0.177)  (0.0522)  (0.0109) 
SLK  ‐0.347*** ‐ 0.0854 ‐ 0.0683 ‐ 0.403  0.725*** ‐ 0.0607 
(0.121)  (0.0596)  (0.171)  (0.718)  (0.212)  (0.0443) 
USA  ‐0.293  0.204  0.777** ‐ 1.684 ‐ 0.963**  0.887*** 
(0.257)  (0.127)  (0.362)  (1.523)  (0.449)  (0.0941) 
Constant  0.0670***  0.0320***  0.0323  0.0831 ‐ 0.0347  0.0116 
(0.0221)  (0.0109)  (0.0312)  (0.131)  (0.0387)  (0.00810) 
Observations  23  23  23  23  23  23 
CZR  0.662*** ‐ 0.198  0.349 ‐ 0.355  0.502 ‐ 0.0775 
(0.196)  (0.219)  (0.218)  (0.272)  (0.339)  (0.145) 
HUN  0.183  1.094*** ‐ 0.417**  0.713***  0.0120  0.242** 
(0.165)  (0.184)  (0.183)  (0.229)  (0.285)  (0.121) 
POL  0.0266 ‐ 0.0483  0.213  0.470** ‐ 0.0459  0.0864 
(0.144)  (0.161)  (0.160)  (0.200)  (0.249)  (0.106) 
ROM  ‐0.196 ‐ 0.335** ‐ 0.137  0.184 ‐ 0.267 ‐ 0.180* 
(0.126)  (0.141)  (0.140)  (0.175)  (0.218)  (0.0928) 
SLK  0.0637  0.149  0.0605  0.267*  0.584***  0.0212 
(0.115)  (0.129)  (0.128)  (0.160)  (0.199)  (0.0850) 
USA  0.559*  0.573*  0.719**  0.519  0.571  0.819*** 
(0.286)  (0.318)  (0.317)  (0.396)  (0.493)  (0.210) 
Constant  0.00648  0.00833  0.0304*** ‐ 0.00511  0.0123  0.00315 
(0.00585)  (0.00652)  (0.00649)  (0.00812)  (0.0101)  (0.00431) 
Observations  32  32  32  32  32  32 
Source: Dependent variable is the growth rate of GDP per capita. The upper part of the table 
represents the sample from 1996 to 2001 and the lower part is from 2002 to 2010. The columns 
represent the regression for each of the countries in the sample. Standard errors in parentheses,* 







Table 10: VAR Regression for CEE countries and Germany: Split Sample 
   CZR  HUN  POL  ROM  SLK  GER 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
CZR  0.446*** ‐ 0.146** ‐ 0.0226 ‐ 0.479  0.427  0.0287 
(0.140)  (0.0743)  (0.213)  (0.875)  (0.274)  (0.0693) 
HUN  ‐1.268***  0.431**  0.301 ‐ 0.585  0.167  0.236 
(0.358)  (0.189)  (0.543)  (2.230)  (0.699)  (0.176) 
POL  ‐0.162 ‐ 0.0875  0.471** ‐ 0.163  0.435  0.193*** 
(0.142)  (0.0753)  (0.216)  (0.888)  (0.278)  (0.0702) 
ROM  0.0430 ‐ 0.0356** ‐ 0.0933**  0.576***  0.110* ‐ 0.0104 
(0.0307)  (0.0162)  (0.0466)  (0.191)  (0.0600)  (0.0151) 
SLK  ‐0.348*** ‐ 0.0678 ‐ 0.0424 ‐ 0.523  0.670*** ‐ 0.168*** 
(0.118)  (0.0622)  (0.178)  (0.733)  (0.230)  (0.0580) 
GER  0.551  0.0987 ‐ 0.760 ‐ 0.122  0.313 ‐ 0.155 
(0.351)  (0.186)  (0.532)  (2.187)  (0.685)  (0.173) 
Constant  0.0715***  0.0339***  0.0277  0.0749 ‐ 0.0354  0.00693 
(0.0219)  (0.0116)  (0.0331)  (0.136)  (0.0427)  (0.0108) 
Observations  23  23  23  23  23  23 
CZR  0.694*** ‐ 0.107  0.421* ‐ 0.300  0.430  0.0930 
(0.200)  (0.228)  (0.228)  (0.276)  (0.320)  (0.229) 
HUN  0.347**  1.274*** ‐ 0.200  0.870***  0.158  0.377** 
(0.141)  (0.161)  (0.161)  (0.195)  (0.226)  (0.162) 
POL  0.0950  0.0454  0.314**  0.544*** ‐ 0.0180  0.291* 
(0.140)  (0.159)  (0.160)  (0.193)  (0.224)  (0.160) 
ROM  ‐0.247* ‐ 0.347** ‐ 0.180  0.155 ‐ 0.389* ‐ 0.372** 
(0.134)  (0.152)  (0.153)  (0.185)  (0.214)  (0.153) 
SLK  ‐0.0691  0.0921 ‐ 0.0681  0.179  0.307  0.00673 
(0.136)  (0.155)  (0.156)  (0.188)  (0.218)  (0.156) 
GER  0.375  0.0936  0.328  0.221  0.901**  0.699** 
(0.253)  (0.288)  (0.289)  (0.349)  (0.405)  (0.290) 
Constant  0.0116  0.00515  0.0325*** ‐ 0.00406  0.0325** ‐ 0.00538 
(0.00897)  (0.0102)  (0.0103)  (0.0124)  (0.0144)  (0.0103) 
Observations  32  32  32  32  32  32 
Source: Dependent variable is the growth rate of GDP per capita. The upper part of the table 
represents the sample from 1996 to 2001 and the lower part is from 2002 to 2010. The columns 
represent the regression for each of the countries in the sample. Standard errors in parentheses,* 
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Figure 3: Investment of German Banks (in US dollars) 
 
 
Source: Bank of International Settlements 
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